Which is why we need to abstract the behaviour that should be regulated and the bounds at which that regulation applies.
- Is the regulation to state that a platform that permits running software developed by third parties is required to permit all applications? (from my read, part of the situation with Russia)
- Is the regulation to state that a hardware platform cannot arbitrarily limit what payment methods software uses? (the Apple Pay restriction)
- Is the regulation to define what a valid fee structure looks like for licensing intellectual property? (the revenue sharing arrangement)
What is the IP licencing you're referring to? Bearing in mind developers effectively pay Apple a fee for IP etc with their dev programme membership, and if IP licences are required to participate in a market, they would likely come under FRAND protection.
I would imagine regulation will eventually be in the scope of "exclusivity without editorial, OR, Editorial without Exclusivity". In other words, they'll be allowed to be:
- the only App Store, but won't be allowed to tie their App Store to their editorial policies for what apps get sold, or to their binary hosting or payment processing service, or;
- An app store where they can exercise editorial, and mandate payment methods and download storage, but banned from preventing competing app stores, or direct sales by developers (which is the current model for macOS).
Either way, the tenor from regulators seems to be "the status-quo is not an option".
That said I'm still not aware of this "subsidised hardware business" you keep mentioning. Loss leading is a common tactic to sell one product at a loss to induce a customer to buy another product but there isn't anything unique about this.
The primary thing about the way consoles operate as loss leaders, is that the losses the console makers take on the hardware don't just benefit them, as would be traditional for loss-leading products (eg printers and printer ink, before the court cases that more or less broke that business model). The console makers take a loss on the hardware to increase the sales of third party developers.
This is something Apple absolutely does not do, and it is a fundamental difference in the business model of Apple, vs Games Console makers. Which is why there is no valid comparison between them for arguing whether it's "ok" for MS/Sony to make whatever commission, or mandate whatever sales channel.
To reiterate, what is the behaviour we wish to mandate and what are the behaviours we wish to prohibit? Then what is the cost and impact of such regulation and does this new legislation impose an excessive burden on members of the existing marketplace or potential new entrants? Then how do we balance the cost trade off?
What regulators are indicating they want, is to prevent Apple requiring developers to buy a service from Apple which they don't wish to use (Apple's payment processing, or Apple's App Storefront, or Apple's Binary Download Hosting) in order to participate in a market for which Apple currently acts as the sole gatekeeper (native applications on iOS).
The basic principle of "owning" a market carries responsibilities, not just rights. Apple is not a feudal lord, with a divine right to rule as it sees fit, and, as seems to be the trend in opinions from regulators, "then go make Android apps if you don't like the iOS conditions" is not an acceptable solution to that problem.
As I've said before, Apple is as bound by market regulations, as a person building a house on "their" land is bound by building codes. Apple can't just decide the rules for themselves, in the same way that a person can't just ignore rules about the maximum number of treads in a staircase before a landing is required. Just as a building regulator will demolish a house that fails to comply with building regs, market regulators will dismantle business models that fail to comply with competition policy.
A lot of people seem fundamentally offended by that idea.