Unlike past innovations by Apple — iPhone (2007), iPod (2001), Newton messaging (1993), PowerBook (1991), Macintosh (1984) — Vision Pro is a solution in search of a problem.
While it’s easy to agree on how three from the above list, as with Vision Pro, enter the market without a robust, third-party software ecosystem, all of the above springboarded from previously existing hardware innovations whose purposes, as delivered by other companies, were already in demand by both business/corporate and personal/leisure markets.
iPhone was a decade-long culmination of the industry “converging” phone, PDA, and internet appliance into one device. The early/mid 2000s was littered with such devices by Compaq HP, Palm, and others — all with varying (and valiant) degrees of effectiveness, but not so much paradigm shifts as they were evolutionary.
iPod tidied up the use of read-write digital storage without the need for external media — an extension of the Rio from 1998 and Compaq’s Personal Jukebox in 1999.
Newton evolved from eight years of business customers using
Psion Series 3, 2, and 1.
PowerBook did what
Macintosh Portable couldn’t: making a Macintosh truly portable and on level with the first wave of PC-based laptops.
Macintosh was derived from the
Xerox Star platform of 1981 and earlier, Xerox PARC desktop/GUI experiments.
Apple today assert
Vision Pro has no market precedent. They assert it is not a VR goggles replacement or competitor, but something else entirely: a kind of wearable “laptop” of sorts. Vision Pro is a product without precedent, whose secondary function is its foundational, inherent ability to monitor and record biometrics (like eye movement, gestures, sound, and other proprioceptive input) continuously, with potential to synthesize data from with those for future applications.
Having used Macs for four decades; having marvelled at Newton and its handwriting recognition component in 1993; having first used a Powerbook at home in 1995; and as a one-time owner of a 1G iPod 5GB, I don’t have a fear of missing out here.
I do believe, for this first generation, Vision Pro is a niche luxury product (i.e., a signifier of one’s means to consume conspicuously) — not too unlike Macintosh in 1984–86.
Unlike Macintosh, Vision Pro is neither extensible nor adaptable (well, except for the prescription inserts and other phantom-charge accessories).
I can envision subsequent generations of Vision Pro being useful for a slim subset of learners who learn best via proprioception, including folks with specific learning disabilities (dyslexia comes to mind).
In Vision Pro, I cannot see a strong case where Apple are polishing an existing idea for wider consumption, as (to their insistence) there is no pre-existing idea. Even best-laid ideas/inventions can and do fail in the hands of able, well-funded innovators. The “It” breakthrough of 2001, a human transporter called the Segway, failed. Other companies, however, built on the paradigm, making possible a wealth of battery-powered human transporters in the decades since.
The point here: Apple rode their way to success by refining and improving on existing paradigms, as with the five listed above. Vision Pro, as Apple insist, dropping several billions into the commitment, is its own paradigm. This is a giant risk by Apple.
So no, I won’t worry about missing out. I‘d rather the market work it out first before I shout, “Shut up and take my money,” — even if, in the end, other companies find ways to compete effectively with Apple’s newly-created innovation, forcing Apple to improve on the innovation and to price it more competitively.
As it is, that’s still a long way off, if at all.